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Control of corporate assets by wealthy families in economies is common, and control 
pyramids concentrate governance powers in a tiny elite in many countries.  This can 
have negative implications for corporate governance.  It can also lead to adverse 
macroeconomic effects when these problems extend across a sufficiently large part of 
the country’ corporate sector.  We consider the reasons why such ownership 
predominates in emerging market economies and in some developed economies.  We 
also discuss reasons why widely held free standing firms predominate in the United 
States.  We conclude by discussing policies countries might adopt to discourage 
family control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids are but one feature of an 
institutionally deficient economy.  A concerted effort to improve a country’s 
institutions is needed before diffuse ownership is desirable.   3
I.   Introduction 
Many countries entrust the governance of their large corporations to a handful of 
wealthy families.  These families use control pyramids to effect these powers.  We 
show that such control pyramids make firms vulnerable to a range of serious 
governance problems.  We also argue that these problems can have adverse 
macroeconomic effects when they extend across a sufficiently large part of the 
country’s corporate sector.  We consider the reasons why family control and control 
pyramids predominate in emerging market economies and in some developed 
economies, and also the reasons why widely held free standing firms predominate in 
the United States.  We conclude by discussing policies countries might adopt to 
discourage family control pyramids, but caution that control pyramids are but one 
feature of an institutionally deficient economy.  A concerted effort to improve a 
country’s institutions is needed before diffuse ownership is desirable.   
 
II.    What is a “Family Firm”? 
Various studies come to different conclusions about the performance of family firms 
relative to that of other firms.  To some extent, this is because they use the term 
“family firm” differently.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) refer to any firm with a 
dominant shareholder as a family firm.  By this definition, Microsoft is a family firm, 
even though Bill Gates has given no notice of any clear intention to pass control on to 
his sons or daughters.  Likewise, their definition would classify Andrew Carnegie’s 
turn of the century Carnegie Steel as a family firm, even though he sold out and gave 
the $480 million he received away to charities.  Indeed, Carnegie’s famous maxim “A 
man who dies rich dies disgraced” would be incomprehensible to the ruling families 
of multigenerational European family businesses.  Nonetheless, Carnegie’s general 
ethos is important and widespread in America:  One gets rich to change the world, not 
to found a dynasty. 
In this study, we define ‘family firm’ more narrowly to encompass only companies 
run by heirs of the people previously in charge or by families that are clearly in the 
process of transferring control to heirs.  This definition may seem incomplete in that it 
misses firms where the current controlling owner ends up founding a dynasty.  Bill 
gates might leave Microsoft to his son, rather than endow universities and concert 
halls so as to die poor, like Andrew Carnegie.  However, we believe that understating 
the importance of family firms, rather than overstating it, is the more judicious 
approach for the purposes of this study. 
Many small businesses throughout the world are family firms.  Small stores, carpentry 
shops, farms, and restaurants are often family affairs.  Casual inspection of any 
shopping area in virtually any free market country shows that these businesses are 
important parts of the economy.  These businesses are also not the focus of this paper.  
This is mainly because data on small businesses, unlike data on larger listed 
companies, are not publicly available.  While survey data of various sorts have been 
compiled for small businesses in some countries, they are, for the most part, not 
comparable from one country to another.  It is to be hoped that this situation might 
change as more and smaller companies list on stock markets and begin publishing 
financial data.  At present, however, we must pass by these firms.   4
Thus, this study examines large family firms – firms big enough to be listed, or run by 
families wealthy enough that their mercantile empires attract the notice of the world’s 
financial press.  Our “family firms” do not include widely held firms, firms controlled 
by an entrepreneur/founder who is not in the process of transferring control to his 
blood descendents, and firms with large outside shareholders such as pension funds.   
 
III. Basic  Facts 
This definition is sensible because we are interested in how the corporate governance 
of large family firms differs from that of other large firms.  We are interested in this 
question because systematic differences in the governance of an economy’s great 
corporations might affect its macroeconomic performance.  This is a reasonable 
concern because the importance of large family firms differs starkly across countries 
and across regions, while families are probably important in small firms everywhere.  
Figure 1 shows the wealth of billionaires residing in a given economy as a fraction of 
gross domestic product.
1    Billionaire wealth is further divided into that of 
entrepreneur billionaires, who built their own fortunes, and family billionaires, who 
inherited their wealth.  In some regions, such as Australia, Israel, South Africa, and 
Southeast Asia, new money billionaire wealth is extensive.  In Canada, India, Western 
Europe, and the United Kingdom, old family billionaire wealth seems dominant.  New 
money and old family money vie for importance in Japan, Latin America, and the 
United States.   
These differences in the sorts of billionaires a country has are important because most 
countries entrust the corporate governance of their large companies to a handful of 
very wealthy families.  This is accomplished through the use of control pyramids.  
Since control pyramids are unknown in the United States and United Kingdom, 
economists trained in those countries are often unaware of the profound effects these 
structures have on both the control of a country’s corporate sector and on political 
economy issues.   
Figure 2 describes a stylized control pyramid.  A family firm, at the apex of the 
pyramid, controls publicly traded firms, which then control other publicly traded 
firms, which then control yet other publicly traded firms.  At each level of the 
pyramid, public shareholders contribute a minority equity stake.  Control pyramids 
are ubiquitous outside the United States and United Kingdom. This has several key 
implications for corporate governance 
1.  Most companies in most countries have controlling shareholders – either 
wealthy families or other firms that, themselves, are controlled by wealthy 
families.  This means that the managers of most firms in most countries serve 
at the pleasure of a wealthy family, not at the pleasure of public shareholders, 
as is the case in the United States and United Kingdom.
2  
                                                 
1 See Morck et al. (2000) for detailed definitions and a description of how the data are constructed. 
2 There is by now a huge literature on country’s ownership structure, since the pioneer work in La Porta 
et al. (1999).  Some recent work includes Attig, Gadhoum and Lang (2003), Faccio and Lang (2002), 
Claessens et al. (2000, 2002), Claessens and Fan (2003), and the papers cited there.      5
2.  Although the owner of the apex firm controls all the firms in the pyramid, her 
actual investment in the firms in the pyramid’s lower tiers is often very small.  
For example,  in Figure 2, a one million dollar decrease in the value of Firm F 
translates to a $510,000 (51% of $1,000,000) decrease in the value of Firm E, 
a $260,100 (51% of $510,000) decrease in the value of Firm D, a  $132,651 
(51% of $260,100) decrease in the value of Firm C, and so on.  A million 
dollar hit on the value of Firm F ultimately translates into a fall of $17,596 in 
the value of the family firm at the apex of the pyramid.  Thus, the ultimate 
controllers of Firm F have a real financial stake of only 1.76% in that firm.  
3.  Control pyramids let a mere handful of wealthy families govern the greater 
part of a country’s corporate sector. This is because pyramids let a family 
control corporate assets worth vastly more than its family wealth.  To see this, 
return to Figure 2.  Suppose the family firm at the apex is worth a mere billion 
dollars.  If the pyramid contains two A level firms worth a billion dollars each, 
four B level firms worth the same each, eight C level firms, and so on, the 
pyramid shown in Figure 2 contains 127 firms, each on paper worth one 
billion dollars.  The control pyramid thus leverages a billion dollars of family 
wealth into control over forms with book values totaling $127 billion.  There 
is much double counting in this, for the assets of a firm in one tier consist 
mainly of stock in the firms in the tier below.  However, even if we assume 
that only the firms in the F tier of the pyramid contain actual physical assets, 
this still adds up to $64 billion.  Thus, by permitting control pyramids, most 
countries entrust the governance of their corporate sectors to a few leading 
families.  Since the most able member of any single family is likely to be less 
able than the most able member of the broader population, this means that 
governance may ultimately not be entrusted to the most able people in the 
country.   
This situation contrasts starkly with the United States and United Kingdom, where 
most large firms are widely held and all large firms are free standing entities.  They 
are widely held in that they have no dominant shareholder.  Insiders often own only a 
fraction of a percent of their firms’ stock, and the largest investors are often pension 
funds with stakes below five percent.  They are free-standing in that they own stock in 
no other domestically listed firm, and no other domestically listed firm owns stock in 
them.   
 
IV.   Possible Advantages of Family Control  
Economists like to assume that if an economic structure is commonplace, it must have 
survival traits – features that give it an edge over alternative structures.  If family 
controlled pyramids are commonplace, perhaps they have some advantage over free-
standing widely held firms. 
   6
Freedom from Agency Problems? 
One common theme in discussions of family firms is that they are allegedly free of 
agency problems.  Agency problems occur when the professional managers in a 
widely held firm maximize their personal utility, rather than the wealth of the firm’s 
investors. For example, a professional manager might spend a million dollars on an 
unnecessary executive jet that gives her pleasure, even though this decreases the value 
of the firm.   Jensen and Meckling (1976) use the term agency problem because, when 
such things occur, the professional manager is failing in her fiduciary duty to be a 
faithful agent of the shareholders.  We use the term other people’s money agency 
problem  to distinguish this from other ways in which this fiduciary duty can be 
compromised.   
Controlling shareholders, when they do exist, in the United States and United 
Kingdom are often seen as able to limit other people’s money agency problems.   
Large shareholders, with considerable wealth tied up in the company, are unlikely to 
allow professional managers too much leeway to neglect the firm.
 Vishny and Shleifer 
(1986) develop this logic in an economic model.  Anderson and Reeb (2003) and 
others find evidence consistent with large shareholders in the United States improving 
firm performance.  Could control pyramids, by spreading a dominant shareholder 
across many firms, improve governance on a larger scale and therefore provide an 
economic advantage to their member firms because they eliminate other people’s 
money agency problems?    
We think this to be unlikely in general.  The reason a large shareholder is thought to 
improve corporate governance in the United States and United Kingdom is that she 
has a large fortune tied up in the firm and is keen to disallow mismanagement.  But 
the previous section shows that control pyramids allow the family owning the apex 
firm to control numerous other firms with very little of their own wealth in each.  If 
the family running the apex firm in the pyramid in Figure 2 ordered that Firm F spend 
a million dollars on an executive jet for the family’s use, the value of Firm F would 
presumably fall by one million dollars.  But we have already seen that this translates 
to a decline of $17,596 in the apex firm.  The family might be loath to spend a million 
dollars on an executive jet, but $17,596 is a price even a university professor might 
find attractive.  In short, the attenuated actual financial stakes the controlling family 
has in firms in the lower tiers of pyramids (which include most of the firms in any 
given pyramid) basically recreates the same incentive problems that can occur in 
widely held firms.  Insiders, this time the family, rather than the professional 
managers, spend outside shareholders’ money on things they want, rather than things 
that build firm value.   
Moreover, there are plausible reasons for thinking that governance problems in 
pyramid firms might be worse than in widely held firms.  This is because widely held 
firms that are too severely mismanaged suffer stock price declines.  These, in turn, 
trigger shareholder lawsuits, hostile takeovers, challenges by institutional investors at 
shareholder meetings, and other pressures that often lead to management’s ouster and 
to corporate policy more aligned with value maximization.  Shareholder lawsuits are 
virtually unknown outside the United States, hostile takeovers are not possible if the 
pyramid is held together with control stakes greater than fifty percent, and 
institutional investors cannot force their representatives onto boards in shareholder 
meetings where more than fifty percent of the votes are controlled by the wealthy   7
family.  When managers cannot be ousted, Morck et al. (1988), Stulz (1988), and 
others say that the firm has an entrenchment agency problem.  In the United States 
and United Kingdom, widely held firms are prone to other people’s money agency 
problems while firms with dominant insider shareholders are prone to entrenchment 
agency problems.  The firms in pyramids are vulnerable to both at the same time.   
Furthermore, pyramid member firms are vulnerable to a third sort of agency problem 
that is not generally thought of in countries of free-standing firms.  This is the 
intercorporate transfer of wealth among pyramid firms to advantage the controlling 
shareholder – what Johnson et al. (2000) call tunneling.  To see this, suppose an asset 
of Firm F in Figure 2 rises in value by a million dollars.  As already noted, only 
$17,596 of this gain ultimately accrues to the family firm at the pyramid’s apex.  The 
rest belongs to one level after another of public shareholders.  However, the family 
controls Firm F’s board since it controls that of Firm E, which it controls because it 
controls the board of Firm D, and so on.  The Family might order Firm F to sell the 
asset to a firm in a higher tier of the pyramid at cost.  For example, if Firm F sells the 
asset to Firm A at its old, low price, the additional million dollars shows up in Firm A 
instead, and now the family’s wealth rises by $510,000 instead of only $17,596.   
Tunneling, an agency problem where the controlling shareholder moves wealth out of 
firms whose cash flows mainly go to public shareholders and into firms whose cash 
flows accrue mainly to the controlling shareholder.     
Consistent with all the above points, Morck et al. (2000) find that Canadian heir 
controlled firms, many of which belong to pyramids, underperform United States 
industry peer firms of comparable size and age, while widely held Canadian firms do 
not.  Claessens, Djankov, Fan, and Lang (2002) investigate the role of pyramids more 
directly, and find that firm value falls when the control rights of the largest 
shareholder exceed his cash-flow ownership in a study of Asian firms.  Lins (2003) 
reproduces this finding in a study of control pyramids in emerging economies, and 
also finds that the effect is weaker in countries with better legal protection for public 
shareholders and in pyramid firms with large outside shareholders.  Presumably, both 
the law and large independent shareholders prevent tunneling and induce better 
governance.    
Bertrand, Mehta, and Mullainathan (2002) test for tunneling among Indian pyramid 
group firms by looking for effects of shocks to one pyramid firm in the stock prices of 
others.  They conclude that tunneling is economically important in Indian control 
pyramids.  Bae, Kang, and Kim (2002) report concordant evidence for Korean family 
run control pyramids, or chaebol.  Lemmon and Lins (2003) report that firms low in 
control pyramids suffered disproportionately in the Asian Crisis of the 1990s, which 
is consistent with the tunneling of wealth from those firms to firms nearer the apexes.  
Attig, Fischer and Gadhoum (2003) report evidence consistent with tunneling in 
Canadian control pyramids.   
Faccio and Lang (2002), in contrast, conclude that tunneling is not widespread in 
Western European control pyramids, and suggest that this might be because the better 
legal environments constraint controlling owners more tightly in Europe than in Asia 
or emerging economies.     
Thus, the contention that family control pyramids attenuate agency problems seems 
unlikely for three reasons.  First, the lower tier firms in control pyramids, which   8
usually contain most of the real assets, are subject to much the same other people’s 
money agency problems as are widely held firms.  Second, the controlling family 
cannot be ousted by disgruntled public shareholders. Consequently, pyramid firms can 
suffer from entrenchment agency problems.  Third, pyramids create scope for a new 
sort of agency problem – tunneling.  Empirical work to date is broadly consistent with 
this viewpoint.   
 
Long-term Planning? 
Another set of arguments for the superiority of family control has to do with families 
having longer time horizons than public shareholders or professional managers.   
Allegedly, widely held firms must pander to myopic shareholders fixation on short 
term earnings, and this adversely affects longer term corporate performance.   
That public shareholders are myopic, and focus only on short term earnings, has long 
been debunked.  The share prices of United States firms that announce increases in 
long term investment rise abruptly, indicating that shareholders like long-term 
investments and rush to buy the stocks of firms that do more.
3  Thus, the view that 
widely held firms are constrained by shareholders to adopt short term planning 
horizons seems implausible.  A more likely scenario might be that professional 
managers have planning horizons concurrent with their expected careers.  
However, this suggests that countries in which control pyramids dominate should 
have higher long-term investment than countries where most large firms are 
professionally managed.  In fact, Morck et al. (2000) report that Canadian heir 
controlled firms underinvest in R&D relative to their industry peer firms of similar 
age and size.  They also report that countries in which old family billionaire wealth is 
larger relative to GDP have lower private sector R&D spending.   
Moreover, Landes (1949) reports that French mercantile families, excessively 
concerned about preserving their corporate patrimony for their heirs, avoided risks 
and curtailed expansion.  He argues that this adversely affected the historical 
development of the French economy.  In contrast, Anderson and Reeb (2003) find no 
evidence of such an effect in the United States, and Daniels et al. (1994) report that 
firms belonging to one of the Canadian Bronfman family’s pyramids were more 
highly leveraged than other comparable firms.  And Högfeldt (2003) reports that 
Swedish firms in old line industries are troubled by overinvestment in physical assets. 
Whether family control provides a long-term planning advantage or the opposite and, 
if so, under what circumstances, remains open questions.  Current evidence fails to 
support the contention, however.   
 
                                                 
3 McConnell and Muscarella (1985) show that US firms share prices rise when they increase spending 
on fixed assets, a form of long term investment.  Chan et al. (1990) report similar results for increases 
in R&D spending, perhaps the investment with the longest time horizon.  Hall (1993) documents a 
highly significant positive correlation between shareholder value and R&D spending.     9
Family Values? 
Another possible virtue of family control is that families, because of the blood ties 
that unite them, are better able to manage corporate affairs smoothly.  However the 
actual governance of family firms is replete with intrafamilial disagreements - 
especially disputes about succession, the exploitation of some family members by 
others, and so on.  While the view that “family values” somehow instill higher 
standards of performance is plausible to many - especially members of controlling 
families -consistent evidence supporting this view has yet to emerge.   
Anderson and Reeb (2003) report that family firms, broadly defined as including any 
firms with dominant shareholders, outperform widely held firms in the United States.  
One possibility is that the very strong investor protection laws of the United States 
allow these benefits to shine through, while weaker protection elsewhere allows the 
three types of agency problems listed above to dominate, accounting for the empirical 
results discussed above.   
However, family control seems associated with superior performance in some low 
income countries as well.  Khanna and Palepu (2000) report that Indian pyramid 
member firms outperform free standing firms.  Khanna and Rivkin (2001) argue that 
family control can bestow other advantages in economies with deeply dysfunctional 
institutions.  If education is poor, family apprenticeships may be the best business 
training.  If capital, labor, and product markets are corrupt and expensive to work with, 
pyramid group firms providing capital to each other, training workers for each other, 
and selling goods and services to each other may be an “optimal second best solution”.   
The same authors also suggest that a family with a good reputation can greatly expand 
the scope and scale of its business dealings with control pyramids.  In an economy 
where corruption is rife, such a family is a preferred business partner, and the firms it 
controls are at an advantage.   
These arguments may well be accurate.  However, they point to the family firm as a 
“fix” for deep problems in an economy, such as poor education, corruption, and so on.  
This hardly seems a resounding endorsement of family control per se.  
Moreover, what is good for family groups may remain bad for an economy.  Almeida 
and Wolfenzon (2003a, b)) suggest that physical capital is excessively concentrated 
within conglomerates or groups, in the sense that more productive investments outside 
of it are missed.  That is, even if capital is efficiently allocated within a group, the 
economy-wide allocation may still be inefficient because the group firms keep capital 
away from outsiders.  This suggests that pyramidal and other groups may not even be 
the second best alternative from a social perspective, especially when an economy is 
beyond the initial state of development.  Indeed, they argue that the more efficiently 
capital is allocated within a group, the more misallocation of capital in the economy.  
  
Political Connections 
Morck et al. (2000), Morck and Yeung (2003), and others speculate that the families 
that run control pyramids may have unique political influence in their countries, and   10
that this might account for their survival, regardless of whether they outperform or 
underperform other firms.  Morck and Yeung (2003) argue that family pyramids are 
preferable trading partners for corrupt politicians.  Family firms are more likely to 
return past favors because of a longer continuity of management.  Control pyramids 
allow a higher level of discretion, for favors done for one firm can be returned by 
another.  Since only a few families typically run the control pyramids that include 
most important firms in most countries, politicians need maintain relationships with 
only a few patriarchs.  In addition, families controlling pyramids have ready sources 
of payments for politicians in lower tier pyramid firms.  At the same time, families 
can “tunnel” the reciprocal favors paid to any pyramid firm to the apex firm. 
For these and other reasons, they propose that a high prevalence of family firms, 
especially when grouped into a few great control pyramids, is a symptom of extensive 
“business-government cooperation”.  This can, and probably does, reflect corruption 
in most cases.  But it could also reflect joint efforts at “nation building”.  The latter 
interpretation is especially favored by some as an explanation for the prevalence of 
control pyramids in Malaysia, Singapore, and Sweden.   
 
V.   Families in Developing Market Economies 
All of the above points conspire to favor family control pyramids in emerging 
economies because these countries have weak institutions – including education 
systems, courts, financial regulators, and organs of government.     
Poor education systems leave potentially brilliant managers to lives as illiterate 
peasants, and may well leave the members of a few dominant families, able to afford 
to send their sons to elite educational institutions abroad, the most able managers.  
Thus, there is a constricted supply of competent managers.   
But there is probably a constricted demand for professional managers as well.   
Educated peasants are apt to be viewed with suspicion by the established elite families, 
and feared as disloyal.  Controlling owners and public shareholders rationally expect 
professional managers to behave opportunistically.  And professional managers may 
actually be deeply unreliable if the courts and regulators fail utterly to restrain their 
pursuit of their own self interest, rendering diffuse ownership less desirable even than 
control pyramids.  With no legal penalties, professional managers may opt to simply 
loot the firm, with no concern for its future or for the wealth of its shareholders – 
managerial myopia in the extreme.   
Corrupt or inefficient courts doubtless magnify the importance of a reputation for fair 
dealing.  A connection with such a family, however distorted by layers of pyramidal 
control, may be a great asset to a firm operating in a country where legal remedies for 
fraud are absent.  In emerging economies, precisely because property rights are ill 
defined, firm value often depends on connections.  Family connections are 
“institutional” features to supplement, or replace, the dysfunctional institutions that 
induce such opportunism.  A family tie is tangible, and family loyalty is often strong 
where arm’s length institutions are weak.  Family loyalty may also include a duty to 
preserve a patrimony for one’s descendents, and thus lengthen planning horizons.  
Sharing a connection with the same controlling family allows trust between   11
businesses in an economy where trust is scarce.  Thus, economic dealings follow 
kinship relations because they are the only reliable guarantors of trustworthy behavior 
in the absence of reliable courts, regulators, and so on.    
Transforming a control pyramid into many free standing widely held firms in these 
countries trades away the benefits of family control discussed above - such as a family 
“name” and reputation, as well as private benefits due to tunneling, political 
connections, and the like.  If public shareholders rights are ill protected, they should 
rationally foresee looting of the firm by professional managers.  Consequently, they 
are unlikely to pay a high enough price for the controlling owner’s shares to fully 
compensate her for these losses.  Indeed, poor legal protection most likely means very 
low prices for these shares. 
The perspective has several implications.  A well developed legal and regulatory 
system that makes public investors confident of their property rights encourages 
families to sell out.  Heirs may come to realize that professionals can run the family’s 
firms better, and may opt to become passive investors with diversified portfolios of 
stock in firms they do not control.  This appears to be the path chosen by numerous 
wealthy American heirs, including the Rockefellers.   
In a regime with partially developed institutions, the entrepreneur may hire 
professional managers, but retain control to monitor them closely. Where market 
mechanisms, like takeovers, independent audits, full disclosure, and institutional 
investors, fail to discipline errant managers, an intermediate degree of 
professionalization happens.  This is observed in economies with enough investment 
in education, but with ill regulated capital markets, such as many East Asian countries. 
Where institutions are thoroughly dysfunctional, the founding family must run its 
firms directly.  When courts, regulators, and the state are entirely corrupt, bestowing 
any governance power on an outsider is an invitation to theft.  Professional managers 
are acceptable only if they join the family through marriages, as was common in Pre-
War Japan.
4    
This absence of trust in professional managers and intense reliance on kinship is self-
reinforcing in a way that may further impede development.  If professional managers 
are expected to steal, they may not be rewarded for honesty.  This may induce them to 
steal.  The situation is akin to that of police who are corrupt because they are 
underpaid and underpaid because they are corrupt.  The overall effect is to lock in 
family control, shut outsiders out of careers in business management, and reduce 
outsiders’ incentives to become educated.  The absence of widely held, professionally 
managed firms retards the development of capital markets and institutions, which 
feeds back to reinforce the need for family control in the first place.  The end result is 
that family control amid general poverty is a stable equilibrium. 
 
                                                 
4 The argument is first made in Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer (2003). Morck and Nakamura (2003) 
describe prewar Japanese mercantile families practice of “adopting” promising employees through 
arranged mariages.   12
VI.  Determinants of Pervasive Family Control  
Different countries have very different patterns of ownership of their large 
corporations.  Why this came to be is the subject of ongoing research by the authors 
of this study and others.  However, preliminary findings point to several key issues: 
1. La  Porta  et al. (1999) show that a country’s legal and regulatory standards are 
related to the ownership structures of its large corporations.  Countries with 
endemic corruption, with poor shareholder legal protection, corrupt judiciaries, 
and the like tend to have highly concentrated ownership, and this usually 
involves wealthy families with control pyramids.  
The reasons for this pattern are not fully clear at present.  One candidate 
explanation, proposed by Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2003), is that large 
shareholders cannot sell out in such environments because becoming a 
diversified passive investor in other firms is simply not a viable alternative.  
Another, proposed by Morck and Yeung (2003), is that control pyramids 
greatly magnify the returns to making deals with corrupt politicians in such 
countries, and are consequently a preferred form of organization.    
One possible implication of these arguments is that reducing the level of 
corruption in a country might also reduce the extent of wealthy family control 
over its economy.  However, caution is warranted.  While there are no 
instances of deeply corrupt countries with a prevalence of widely held firms, 
there are many passably honest countries in which family firms are important.  
Sweden and Canada are but two examples.  Thus, honest institutions might be 
a prerequisite for dispersed ownership, but not a cause of it.   
2.  A country’s tax system probably has implications for the allocation of control 
over its great corporations.  Morck (2003) shows that, with certain 
qualifications and exceptions, dividends paid by one firm to another are 
subject to double taxation in the United States, but virtually everywhere else 
dividends are only taxable when paid by a company to an individual.  This 
makes control pyramids, such as the structure in Figure 2, deeply tax 
disadvantaged.  In the United States, taxes are leveled on the dividend firm F 
pays to Firm E.  When Firm E passes this money along to Firm D as a 
dividend, taxes fall due again.  Thus, the dividends Firm F pays are taxed 
many times before accruing to the family firm at pyramid’s apex.  Morck 
(2003) shows that the United States adopted this system of taxation in the 
1930s explicitly to force the breakup of control pyramids.  Becht and DeLong 
(2003) show that control pyramids were ubiquitous in the United States until 
the 1930s, and then abruptly disappeared.  Another cause of this was certainly 
the Public Utilities Holding Companies Act which banned pyramiding outright 
among public utilities firms.   
Morck  et al. (2003) show that about half of Canada’s great corporations 
belong to family pyramids now, and that the situation was almost precisely the 
same a century ago.  But in the 1960s, most Canadian firms were widely held. 
They raise several possible explanations, but one is that Canada levied a high 
inheritance tax until the 1970s, when it was replaced by a capital gains tax   13
with extensive loopholes.  The United States, in contrast, continued to enforce 
an inheritance tax at much higher levels than apply in most European countries. 
This suggests that a country might break up its control pyramids by adopting a 
United States style tax code that subjects inter-corporate dividends to double 
(i.e. multiple) taxation, or that taxes inheritances heavily.  However, caution is 
warranted again. Aganin and Volpin (2003) show that Italy’s temporary 
adoption of double taxation did not discourage pyramiding.  One possible 
explanation is that the Italian code was not vigorously enforced, or contained 
loopholes.   
3.  Roe (2003) points out that rich countries with extensive family control 
pyramids tend to be more social democratic, while those with dispersed 
ownership tend to have more liberal politics.  He proposes that strong owners 
are needed to balance the power accorded organized labor in social 
democracies, and that this is why family run control pyramids persist in those 
economies.   
This is an fascinating insight, but its empirical pedigree is clouded by the 
extreme leftist politics of the United Kingdom in the 1970s apparently 
coexisting with dispersed ownership, and the importance of banks, rather than 
families, in the governance of German firms.  It may be possible to explain 
these discrepancies, but other explanations for Roe’s observation are possible.  
For example, Högfeldt (2003) argues that a symbiotic relationship between 
Sweden’s social democratic rulers and her great mercantile families developed 
over time.  The Social Democrats taxed income heavily, preventing the 
emergence of new competitors and locking in the supremacy of established 
firms.  In return, Sweden’s great families supported the SDP.  
4.  It may be that openness to the world economy curtails the benefits of control 
pyramids.  Morck et al. (2000) show that Canada’s acceptance of free trade 
with the United States in 1988 triggered a fall in the share prices of firms 
controlled by its old billionaire families relative to the share prices of 
independent firms.  They propose that free trade was expected to raise 
competitive pressures and make political connections less valuable; and that 
these effects benefited independent firms, which were more competitive, and 
harmed old family firms, which were better connected to the country’s 
political elite.   
This suggests that globalization, by increasing competitive pressures and 
reducing the value of political connections, might undermine the advantages 
that sustained control pyramids in many countries
5.  This explanation is, of 
course, dependent on the premise that control pyramids exist primarily to 
attract, capture, and funnel political intervention in the economy.  
 
                                                 
5 See also, Rajan and Zingales (2003).   14
VII.   Implications 
A more basic issue remains open, though:  Ought government policy to support 
family run control pyramids or break them up?  Morck et al. (2000) argue that 
entrusting extensive corporate control to a few old families is generally undesirable.  
They find that countries with old billionaire wealth larger relative to GDP grow more 
slowly than otherwise similar countries with few billionaires or with new money 
billionaires.  They view control pyramids as locking in the economic dominance of 
established old money families.   
Morck et al. (2000) also report that Canadian firms controlled by old money families 
do less R&D, and that the corporate sectors of countries in which inherited billionaire 
wealth is more important spend less on R&D.  Since much evidence now supports 
Schumpeter’s (1934) thesis that innovation is the primary engine of economic growth, 
this is of concern.  Much innovation is disruptive of old established firms.  The advent 
of the personal computer was a difficult time for makers of mainframe computers, and 
many failed.   They suggest that established wealthy families might suppress 
innovation to preserve the value of their existing capital assets.   
They also report that old money Canadian firms appear to have enjoyed preferential 
access to capital, at least prior to free-trade with the United States.  If old money 
families can exercise control over their countries banking systems, either directly by 
controlling the banks or indirectly by lobbying politicians and bureaucrats, this also 
bodes ill.  King and Levine (1993) argue that the key role of a country’s financial 
system is to back innovators, thereby promoting growth.  A financial system too much 
controlled by old money might be loath to do this for the reasons cited above.    
Nonetheless, adopting policies aimed only at undermining family control pyramids 
may not be advisable.  Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) warn us that corruption and ill-
developed shareholder rights probably make dispersed ownership unviable.  Khanna 
and Rivkin (2001) warn us that family control pyramids may be a sensible, though 
imperfect, adaptation to dysfunctional markets and institutions in many developing 
countries.  The United States, as it adopted tax and other policies to undermine 
pyramids, also greatly strengthened the legal protection accorded public shareholders 
by establishing the SEC and funding it well.  This happy confluence allowed 
dispersed ownership to continue.  In contrast, Morck and Nakamura (2003) show that 
the dispersed ownership introduced in Japan by the United States Occupation Force 
without similar accompanying reforms in the late 1940s did not survive.   
Finally, the conclusions of Morck et al. (2000) that family control pyramids are 
consistent with a North American perspective on democracy with checks and balances, 
in which any great concentration of power is undesirable.  Europeans, Asians, Latin 
Americans, and Africans, with more recent traditions of feudalism and socialism may 
find a concentration of economic power in benevolent hands reassuring.    15
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Figure 1.  The Importance of New Money and Old Family Billionaire Wealth in the Economies of Different parts of the 
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Figure 2 
A Stylized Diagram of a Typical Corporate Control Pyramid 
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